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ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 In this action, plaintiff Bensalem Township (Township) 
appeals the district court order dismissing its complaint against 
defendants, International Surplus Lines Insurance Co. and Crum & 
Forster Managers Corp. (Insurers), for failure to state a claim 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Township had contracted 
with Insurers for professional liability insurance covering all 
civil claims first made against the town or its officials during 
the policy period.  The agreement included a typical exclusion 
clause that barred coverage of any claims arising from pre-policy 
litigation.  When Township renewed its policy in 1989, Insurers 
added language expanding the scope of what Township had come to 
expect as the standard prior litigation exclusion clause.  The 
new exclusion limited coverage to claims completely unrelated to 
  
any prior matter, regardless of whether the matter involved 
litigation for money damages.  Thereafter, Blanche Road Corp. 
(Blanche Road), a real estate developer, filed a federal civil 
rights complaint naming several Township officials as defendants.  
The lawsuit was the result of years of friction between Blanche 
Road and Township regarding the development of certain parcels of 
land located in Township.  After several attempts to obtain 
coverage under the insurance policy for the cost of defending the 
Blanche Road litigation, Township filed the instant complaint.  
The district court subsequently granted Insurers' motion to 
dismiss, concluding that the Blanche Road lawsuit fell within the 
express terms of the policy's exclusion clause.  It held that the 
provision barred coverage because the federal cause of action 
involved the same underlying facts and circumstances as several 
pre-policy state disputes.  Township challenges this decision, 
arguing that the new language added to the exclusion clause is 
inconsistent with the parties' reasonable expectations.  
Moreover, Township maintains that the district court erred by not 
giving it the opportunity to prove its contention through further 
development of the record. 
 Township also appeals the district court order imposing 
a sanction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.  The court imposed a 
$2000 sanction on Township after finding that it had failed to 
conduct a reasonable inquiry when it filed a motion to determine 
the Rule 59(e) motion in the district court while a petition for 
  
rehearing was pending on appeal.  Township contends that the 
motion was reasonable under the circumstances because a premature 
appeal does not divest the district court of jurisdiction to 
consider a pending Rule 59(e) motion. 
 For the reasons set forth below, we will reverse the 
dismissal of the complaint and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  We will also reverse the order 
imposing a Rule 11 sanction against Township. 
 I. 
 Township, a Bucks County, Pennsylvania, municipality,  
filed its complaint in state court on July 29, 1991.  Insurers 
subsequently removed the action to the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  We accept as 
true the following allegations, contained in Township's 
complaint, in light of Insurers' motion to dismiss.  See Holder 
v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 A. The Insurance Policy 
 In April 1989, Township renewed its Public Officials' 
and Employees' Liability Insurance Policy with Insurers for one 
year, commencing April 15, 1989.  Although aware of the addition 
to the prior litigation exclusion clause, Township apparently 
believed it was receiving essentially the same type of insurance 
policy it had always received from Insurers, subject in essence 
to the usual exclusions.   
  
 The agreement covers any monetary loss up to $1,000,000 
for civil claims made during the policy period arising from 
wrongful acts of the insured.  The policy states:  
 
  A. The company will pay on behalf of 
the Insureds all Loss which the Insureds 
shall be legally obligated to pay for any 
civil claim or claims first made against them 
because of a Wrongful Act, provided that the 
claim is first made during the policy period  
and written notice of said claim is received 
by the Company during the policy period. 
 
  B. The Company will reimburse the 
Public Entity for all Loss for which the 
Public entity shall be required by law to 
indemnify the Insureds for any civil claim or 
claims first made against them because of a 
Wrongful Act, provided that the claim is 
first made during the policy period and 
written notice of said claim is received by 
the Company during the policy period.  
 
(emphasis added). 
 While the claims made portion of the policy is 
identical to that of the prior agreement, there is a significant 
difference in the policy's exclusion provision.  In the past, the 
parties had agreed to a typical prior litigation exclusion clause 
that bars all claims relating to pre-policy lawsuits.  When the 
policy was renewed, however, Insurers expanded the scope of that 
provision.  The new exclusion states:   
 
 It is understood and agreed that the insurer 
shall not be responsible for making any 
payment for loss in connection with any claim 
made against any insured based upon, arising 
out of, or in consequence of or in any way 
involving: 
  
 
 (1) any prior and/or pending litigation 
as of 2/1/89 [pre-policy period] 
including but not limited to 
matters before local, state, or 
federal boards, commissions, or 
administrative agencies, or 
 
 (2) any fact, or circumstance, or 
situation underlying or alleged in 
such litigation or matter. 
 
(emphasis added).  Insurers added language that effectively 
restricts coverage to only those claims completely unrelated to 
any pre-policy dispute, regardless of whether the dispute 
involved a legal claim covered by the policy. 
 Township has argued both before us and before the 
district court that it did not expect that the new exclusionary 
language would bar claims that had not previously been presented 
to it as insurable claims, e.g., petitions for injunctive relief 
or proceedings before administrative agencies.  
 B.  The Blanche Road Dispute       
 In December 1989, Blanche Road named Township and many 
of its current and former officials and employees in a federal 
civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See Blanche Road 
Corp. v. Township, No. 89-9040 (E.D. Pa. filed December 20, 
1989).  The suit was the culmination of several years of 
contention arising from the development of the Blanche Road 
Industrial Park located in Township.   
 In 1987, Blanche Road commenced development of certain 
parcels of land by securing the necessary town building permits 
  
and entering into agreements of sale with several buyers.  
Subsequently, Township made some financial demands which Blanche 
Road alleged were not required by any town ordinance.  Township 
then issued a stop work order and cited Blanche Road with certain 
town ordinance violations.  On December 30, 1987, Blanche Road 
appealed the order to the Town Code Appeals Board.  While the 
appeal was pending, Township revoked Blanche Road's building 
permits and issued a second stop work order. 
 Thereafter, on January 20, 1988, Blanche Road filed a 
complaint in quo warranto in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks 
County, Pennsylvania.  It sought an order declaring that the Town 
Code Appeals Board members' appointments were null and void.  
Blanche Road wanted the members excluded from serving on the 
Board.   
 Blanche Road also filed an equity action in state court 
on February 19, 1988.  In that suit, Blanche Road sought 
injunctive and declaratory relief as well as some ancillary 
damages.  Blanche Road asked the court to enjoin Township from 
enforcing a stop work order and levying fines or penalties.  
Moreover, it wanted the court to declare the stop work order null 
and void.  The only damages Blanche Road sought were for the 
delay of some construction work and certain related interest and 
wages.  The suit was settled when both parties stipulated that 
the building permits would be reinstated.1 
                     
1
.   We note that there were two other state court 
proceedings that related to the Blanche Road dispute.  Neither of 
  
 Blanche Road subsequently filed its federal civil 
rights complaint alleging that certain Township officials had 
violated the Due Process Clause by attempting to coerce payments 
not required by law and by impeding Blanche Road's development of 
the Industrial Park.  In addition, Blanche Road claimed that 
Township had violated the Equal Protection Clause by applying 
different standards from those used for other developers.  This 
was the first time that Blanche Road filed a federal action 
against Township seeking money damages.  It was also the first 
time that Blanche Road raised constitutional claims and the first 
time that many of the town officials were named as defendants.  A 
trial was held, and a jury entered a verdict in favor of Blanche 
Road in the amount of $2,000,000 plus interest, costs, and 
attorneys' fees.  The district court subsequently granted 
Township's motion for a new trial.  That trial is apparently 
still pending. 
 C.  Township's Declaratory Judgment Action 
 Once the Blanche Road federal litigation commenced, 
Township filed a claim with Insurers under the terms of the 
(..continued) 
the proceedings were initiated by Blanche Road.  In one case, 
certain individual owners of lots within the Industrial Park 
filed a complaint in mandamus naming the Town Board of 
Supervisors as defendants.  The owners sought to compel the Board 
to approve certain improvements they made to their property and 
to release the owners from their obligations under a letter of 
credit. 
 In another related case, a Township official swore out 
a private criminal complaint in District Justice Court against 
one of Blanche Road's principals.  The complaint related to a 
dispute over one of the lots in the Industrial Park. 
  
insurance policy.  Township believed it was entitled to coverage 
because the civil rights complaint was filed during the policy 
period and it was the first time Blanche Road had filed a federal 
suit seeking money damages.  Township had not filed a claim with 
Insurers for any of the prior state Blanche Road proceedings 
because they involved equitable relief not covered under the 
general provisions of the policy.   
 After a dispute arose between Insurers and Township 
regarding coverage under the policy, Township filed the instant 
complaint in the Court of Common Pleas for Bucks County, 
Pennsylvania, seeking both declaratory and monetary relief.  
Insurers removed the action to the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Township alleged that 
the insurance policy covered the Blanche Road litigation and that 
Insurers had a contractual duty to pay defense costs.  Township 
also alleged that certain aspects of the policy were ambiguous 
and should be construed in favor of coverage. 
 Insurers filed a motion to dismiss Township's complaint 
for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  They argued that the 
policy exclusion barred coverage because the Blanche Road federal 
litigation involved similar facts and issues as the five prior 
state proceedings for equitable relief.  While under the former 
exclusion provision claims would only be barred if they related 
to prior litigation, Insurers maintained that the language in the 
  
new policy specifically barred claims relating to any prior 
administrative proceeding or matter.   
 Township opposed Insurers' motion and in connection 
with this opposition requested that it be permitted to conduct 
discovery to demonstrate its reasonable expectation that 
litigation, such as the Blanche Road case, would be covered by 
the policy.  Township gave the following explanation of the areas 
in which it needed to take discovery and the underlying reasons 
for this discovery: 
 b.   Defendants have relied, in their Motion to 
dismiss, on Endorsement No. 1 as an exclusionary 
clause, concerning prior claims and litigation. 
  Plaintiff's need to discover what, if any, 
discussions, explanations or other information 
Defendants', their agents or representatives gave 
to the Plaintiff explaining this exclusion, how it 
would impact on the Township and relate to other 
conflicting exclusions in the said policy, i.e., § 
111 Definition, ¶ 4(a), excluding all claims for 
"non-money" damages.  Written discovery and 
depositions of Defendants' agents and employees 
would be necessary. 
 
 c.   Plaintiff needs to discover prior drafts and 
Defendants' internal memos and discussions 
concerning the insurance policy in issue as well 
as Endorsement No. 1.  This, we believe, will also 
defelop proof that Defendants' generally do not 
enforce or even attempt to apply Endorsement No. 1 
as they have in this case, i.e., to prior 
uninsurable claims. 
 
 d. The instant policy does not define what an 
insurable claim is except by negative inference in 
III Definitions, ¶ 4(a), i.e., money damages only.  
Plaintiff needs to take written and oral discovery 
on this issue.  Plaintiff believes that discovery 
will reveal that had the 'prior claims and facts 
related thereto' been timely filed under 
Defendants' policy, Defendants would have rejected 
  
the claims anyway.  Thus., Plaintiff will be able 
to prove that Defendants' "prior claim" exclusion, 
if not ambiguous (but it is), really meant "prior 
insurable claims."      
 
 g. Plaintiff will need to take the depositions of 
former Bensalem Township officials, 
representatives and/or employees, who no longer 
work for the Township, with respect to their 
knowledge, understanding and discussions with 
Defendants and their agents concerning the policy, 
claims and exclusions in issue... 
 
Appellant's Brief at 9 (footnote omitted).  Insurers moved to 
stay discovery pending resolution of their motion to dismiss.  
The district court granted the stay on March 27.  The issue of 
further discovery was then mooted when, by order entered June 15, 
1992, the district court granted Insurers' motion to dismiss.  
 In its memorandum, dismissing the complaint, the 
district court held that the policy exclusion expressly precluded 
coverage because the Blanche Road federal litigation involved the 
same underlying circumstances as the pre-policy state 
proceedings.  It concluded that the exclusion was unambiguous and 
should be enforced according to its plain language. 
 D.  Post-Judgment Proceedings 
 On June 23, 1992, Township sent a letter to the court, 
stating that the order was unclear because it did not indicate 
whether it was with or without prejudice and it did not specify 
both defendants.  Township also stated that, if the dismissal was 
without prejudice, it would move to file an amended complaint.  
It appears that Township intended the letter as a motion to amend 
the district court order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).   On 
  
July 7, 1992, prior to receiving a response from the court, 
Township filed its amended complaint.  On July 8, 1992, Township 
filed a notice of appeal.  On July 9, 1992, the district court 
denied Township's motion to file an amended complaint.  The order 
did not address the Rule 59(e) motion. 
 By order entered October 13, 1992, we dismissed 
Township's July 8, 1992, appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  
Township subsequently filed a petition for rehearing in this 
Court and a motion to determine the Rule 59(e) motion in the 
district court.  Insurers filed a response to the district court 
motion, indicating that the petition for rehearing divested the 
district court of jurisdiction.  Insurers also filed a motion for 
sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 stating that it incurred 
legal fees of $8,800 responding to the "unnecessary" district 
court motion.  The district court dismissed Township's motion to 
determine the Rule 59(e) motion for lack of jurisdiction.  
 On November 30, 1992, we granted Township's request for 
panel rehearing and issued an opinion affirming and clarifying 
our earlier decision dismissing Township's appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction.  We held that the appeal was premature because 
Township's June 23, 1992, letter to the district court was a Rule 
59(e) motion that tolled the time for appeal until thirty days 
after the district court disposed of the motion.  Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(4). 
  
 On December 2, 1992, Township renewed its motion to 
determine the Rule 59(e) motion in the district court.  By order 
entered January 14, 1993, the district court denied Township's 
motion.  On the same day, the court entered a separate order, 
granting Insurers' motion for Rule 11 sanctions.  The court 
awarded Insurers $2000.  Township's timely appeals followed.  
 II. 
 The district court had diversity jurisdiction of this 
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 We exercise plenary review of the district court's 
dismissal of a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Ditri 
v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc., 954 F.2d 869, 
871 (3d Cir. 1992).  We review the district court order imposing 
Rule 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion.  Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 385 (1990).   
      III. 
 We first address the issue of whether Township's 
complaint was properly dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6).   We accept all well-pleaded allegations in Township's 
complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences from the 
avowed facts in favor of Township.  We may affirm the dismissal 
only if it appears certain that no relief could be granted under 
any provable set of facts.  Blaw Knox Retirement Income Plan v. 
  
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1185, 1188 (3d Cir. 1993), 
cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 687 (1994).   
 The district court exercised diversity jurisdiction and 
was obliged to apply the substantive law of the state in which it 
sits.  Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).  
The parties agree that Pennsylvania law governs this case.  
 A. Reasonable Expectations 
 We find that the district court should not have 
dismissed the complaint without allowing discovery on the issue 
of whether the new language added to the insurance policy's prior 
litigation exclusion clause is inconsistent with Township's 
reasonable expectation of the type of coverage provided under the 
agreement.  While Township may have known of the change in the 
language of the exclusion clause when it renewed the policy, it 
should nevertheless have the opportunity to discover and submit 
evidence that Insurers had created in it a reasonable expectation 
that the policy would cover claims such as that presented by the 
federal Blanche Road litigation. 
 Insurers dispute the notion that we should consider 
what the parties' reasonable expectations might have been, 
arguing that such an inquiry is precluded under Pennsylvania law 
where the terms of a policy are clear and unambiguous.  Indeed, 
Insurers correctly state what appears to be the general rule in 
Pennsylvania.  Thus, in the run of cases, "[w]here ... the 
language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, a court is 
  
required to give effect to that language."  Standard Venetian 
Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d 563, 
566 (1983).  Insurers point to the new language added to the 
exclusion clause which, they argue, expressly bars coverage of 
the Blanche Road federal litigation because the dispute arises 
from the same facts and circumstances as the pre-policy state and 
local proceedings. 
 As we read the Pennsylvania case law, courts have 
justified this rule based in part on the supposition that in most 
cases the language of an insurance policy will provide the best 
indication of the content of the parties' reasonable 
expectations.  The courts have made it clear that the parties' 
reasonable expectations are to be the touchstone of any inquiry 
into the meaning of an insurance policy.  Yet 
 [a]ny reasonable expectation which would be 
imputed to the parties by this or any court 
must necessarily rely upon, and be reasonably 
consistent with, the written document and 
phraseology, simply because any 
interpretation advanced contrary to the 
contents of the written document could hardly 
be viewed as "reasonable" to assert; unless 
good reason in law is advanced for the 
disregarding of the clearly contrary 
phraseology. 
J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 396 Pa. Super. 
185, 578 A.2d 468, 472 (1990) (emphasis added), aff'd in part and 
rev'd in part, 534 Pa. 29, 626 A.2d 502 (1993).  See also 
Tonkovic v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 513 Pa. 445, 521 A.2d 
920, 926 (1987) ("Courts should be concerned with assuring that 
  
the insurance purchasing public's reasonable expectations are 
fulfilled.") (quoting Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 479 
Pa. 579, 388 A.2d 1346, 1353 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 
(1979)); Frain v. Keystone Ins. Co., ___ Pa. Super. ___, 640 A.2d 
1352, 1354 (1994) ("While reasonable expectations of the insured 
are the focal points in interpreting the contract language of 
insurance policies, an insured may not complain that his or her 
reasonable expectations were frustrated by policy limitations 
which are clear and unambiguous.") (citations omitted); Everett 
Cash Mut. Ins. Co. v. Krawitz, 430 Pa. Super. 25, 633 A.2d 215, 
216 (1993) ("[C]ourts must focus on the reasonable expectation of 
the insured in an insurance transaction.") (citations omitted); 
Dibble v. Security of American Life Ins. Co., 404 Pa. Super. 205, 
590 A.2d 352, 354 (1991) ("[T]he proper focus regarding issues of 
coverage under insurance contracts is the reasonable expectation 
of the insured.  Courts must examine the totality of the 
insurance transaction involved to ascertain the reasonable 
expectation of the insured.") (citations omitted); Harford Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Moorhead, 396 Pa. Super. 234, 578 A.2d 492, 495 
(1990) ("[O]verly-subtle or technical interpretations may not be 
used to defeat reasonable expectations of insureds."), appeal 
denied, 527 Pa. 617, 590 A.2d 757 (1991).  Accordingly, in 
certain situations the insured's reasonable expectations will be 
allowed to defeat the express language of an insurance policy. 
  
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first began to carve out 
exceptions to the general rule in Collister.2  The court began 
its analysis by observing that transactions between insurers and 
insureds are fundamentally different from those between parties 
to contracts as envisioned by the common law. 
 The traditional contractual approach fails to 
consider the true nature of the relationship 
between the insurer and its insureds.  Only 
through the recognition that insurance 
contracts are not freely negotiated 
agreements entered into by parties of equal 
status; only by acknowledging that the 
conditions of an insurance contract are for 
the most part dictated by the insurance 
companies and that the insured cannot 
"bargain" over anything more than the 
monetary amount of coverage purchased, does 
our analysis approach the realities of an 
insurance transaction. 
                     
2
.  The process actually started with Justice Manderino's opinion 
in Rempel v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 471 Pa. 404, 370 A.2d 366 
(1977), with which two justices concurred while the remaining 
three concurred in the judgment without opinion.  The opinion 
stated: "Consumers ... view an insurance agent ... as one 
possessing expertise in a complicated subject.  It is therefore 
not unreasonable for consumers to rely on the representations of 
the expert rather than on the contents of the insurance policy 
itself."  370 A.2d at 368.  Moreover, the opinion noted, in 
response to Nationwide's assertion that allowing the plaintiff's 
misrepresentation theory to succeed would lead to an increase in 
fraudulent claims, that the court had "very little sympathy for 
Nationwide's alleged concerns in view of the fact that its 
procedures necessitate reliance by a consumer on the 
representations of an insurance agent."  Id. at 370.  This notion 
that insurers bring these lawsuits upon themselves through their 
arcane practices is something of a theme in the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court's subsequent cases on the subject. 
  
Collister, 388 A.2d at 1353.  Because of the unique dynamics of 
this relationship between insurers and insureds, certain 
principles must guide the interpretation of insurance policies. 
 Courts should be concerned with assuring that 
the insurance purchasing public's reasonable 
expectations are fulfilled.  Thus, regardless 
of the ambiguity, or lack thereof, inherent 
in a given set of insurance documents 
(whether they be applications, conditional 
receipts, riders, policies, or whatever), the 
public has a right to expect that they will 
receive something of comparable value in 
return for the premium paid.  Courts should 
also keep alert to the fact that the 
expectations of the insured are in large 
measure created by the insurance industry 
itself.  Through the use of lengthy, complex 
and cumbersomely written applications, 
conditional receipts, riders, and policies, 
to name a just a few, the insurance industry 
forces the insurance consumer to rely upon 
the oral representations of the insurance 
agent.  Such representations may or may not 
accurately reflect the contents of the 
written document and therefore the insurer is 
often in a position to reap the benefit of 
the insured's lack of understanding of the 
transaction. 
Id. 
 With Collister, Pennsylvania seemed to have taken a 
significant step toward adopting the reasonable expectations 
principle as stated by then-Professor Keeton in his landmark 
article.3  See Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable 
                     
3
.  Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with 
Policy Provisions, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 967 (1970) (providing 
the following formulation of the reasonable expectations 
principle: "The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants 
and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance 
contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the 
  
Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 
823, 829 (1990).4  Five years later, however, the court appeared 
to pull back from its enthusiastic endorsement of the doctrine.  
Indeed, in Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. 
Co., 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d 563 (1983), the court failed even to 
acknowledge its opinion in Collister while holding that "where 
... the policy limitation relied upon by the insurer to deny 
coverage is clearly worded and conspicuously displayed, the 
insured may not avoid the consequences of that limitation by 
proof that he failed to read the limitation or that he did not 
understand it."  469 A.2d at 567.  Even so, the court noted that 
(..continued) 
policy provisions would have negated those expectations.").  
Since Professor Keeton's article, a considerable number of trees 
have been sacrificed in the name of reasonable expectations as 
the academic community has debated what reasonable expectations 
means, which courts have adopted the doctrine, and whether it is 
desirable for them to have done so.  See generally John D. 
Ingram, Should an Insured Be Rewarded for Not Reading the 
Policy?, 41 Drake L. Rev. 705 (1992); Roger C. Henderson, The 
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two 
Decades, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 823 (1990); Stephen J. Ware, A Critique 
of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1461 
(1989); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 
Conn. L. Rev. 323 (1986); Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and 
Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the 
Insured, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1151 (1981).  Among the courts that have 
not clearly adopted the doctrine, the statements of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court are perhaps the most conflicting.  
E.g., Henderson, 51 Ohio St. L.J. at 829-31. 
4
.  As Professor Henderson points out, Professor Keeton, who by 
that time had become Judge Keeton, read Collister as adopting the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations "in a form explicitly going 
beyond merely resolving ambiguities against insurers."  Davenport 
Peters Co. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 490 F.Supp. 286, 291 & n.5 
(D. Mass. 1980) (Keeton, J.). 
  
"in light of the manifest inequality of bargaining power between 
an insurance company and a purchaser of insurance, a court may on 
occasion be justified in deviating from the plain language of a 
contract of insurance."  Id. 
 Finally, in 1987, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
decided Tonkovic v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 513 Pa. 445, 
521 A.2d 920 (1987).  In Tonkovic the insurer, following its 
acceptance of the insured's application and payment, unilaterally 
limited the scope of the coverage provided by the policy by 
inserting an exclusion about which it never informed the insured.  
Despite the unambiguity of the exclusion, the court felt that 
Standard Venetian Blind was distinguishable.  In Standard 
Venetian Blind, the court reasoned, the policy "was what it 
purported to be, and what the insured purchased, a general 
liability policy," 521 A.2d at 923, with all the usual incidents 
and exclusions. 
 We find a crucial distinction between cases 
where one applies for a specific type of 
coverage and the insurer unilaterally limits 
that coverage, resulting in a policy quite 
different from what the insured requested, 
and cases where the insured received 
precisely the coverage that he requested but 
failed to read the policy to discover clauses 
that are the usual incident of the coverage 
applied for. 
Id.  Accordingly, the court held that "where ... an individual 
applies and prepays for specific insurance coverage, the insurer 
may not unilaterally change the coverage provided without an 
affirmative showing that the insured was notified of, and 
  
understood, the change, regardless of whether the insured read 
the policy."  Id. at 925 (emphasis added). 
 A couple of other points about the Tonkovic opinion 
bear mentioning.  The first of these is that the court 
specifically found that the trial court's jury instruction 
correctly stated Pennsylvania law.  Id.  This is significant 
given the content of the charge: 
 This is what the cases have said: the burden 
is upon the insurer ... to establish the 
insured's ... awareness and understanding of 
the exclusions.  So, even though the initial 
burden in this case is with the plaintiff and 
it stays with the plaintiff, indeed, there is 
a burden upon the insurance company in this 
case to prove to you by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that [the insured] was aware 
and understood the exclusion that existed 
here ... . 
Id. at 922 (quoting the trial court).  The second point of 
consequence is that the court expressly noted that its holding 
was in accord with Collister, id. at 925, and proceeded to quote 
the core provisions of the Collister opinion, including the 
second block of language that we have quoted above.  Id. at 926. 
 Faced with Collister, Standard Venetian Blind, and 
Tonkovic, we are unable to draw any categorical distinction 
between the types of cases in which Pennsylvania courts will 
allow the reasonable expectations of the insured to defeat the 
unambiguous language of an insurance policy and those in which 
the courts will follow the general rule of adhering to the 
precise terms of the policy.  One theme that emerges from all the 
  
cases, however, is that courts are to be chary about allowing 
insurance companies to abuse their position vis-a-vis their 
customers.  Thus we are confident that where the insurer or its 
agent creates in the insured a reasonable expectation of coverage 
that is not supported by the terms of the policy that expectation 
will prevail over the language of the policy.  In many cases, 
this is simply another way of saying what the supreme court made 
clear in Tonkovic, that an insurer may not make unilateral 
changes to an insurance policy unless it both notifies the 
policyholder of the changes and ensures that the policyholder 
understands their significance.  In other cases this requires a 
more straightforward application of the principles of equitable 
estoppel which, as this court has recognized, West American Ins. 
Co. v. Park, 933 F.2d 1236, 1239 (3d Cir. 1991), underlie the 
cases that we have discussed and are manifest in the supreme 
court's repeated observations that the insurance industry and its 
recondite practices are responsible for deviations from the 
general rule.  In both types of cases the insured, as a result of 
the insurer's either actively providing misinformation about the 
scope of coverage provided by a policy or passively failing to 
notify the insured of changes in the policy, receives something 
other than what it thought it purchased.5  In consequence, as the 
                     
5
.  In contrast, cases like Standard Venetian Blind concern 
situations where the insured has no reasonable basis for 
believing that a policy covers events that it does not.  That is, 
the insurer has neither told the insurer that a policy would 
cover certain events when by its terms it does not, nor made a 
change in the terms of coverage after the insured has agreed to 
  
supreme court was careful to point out in both Collister, 388 
A.2d at 1353, and Tonkovic, 521 A.2d at 926, "the insurer is 
often in a position to reap the benefit of the insured's lack of 
understanding of the transaction." 
 In this case had the district court permitted Township 
to amend its complaint and proceed with discovery, Township might 
have been able to assert one of these types of claims.  On 
remand, Township might be able to demonstrate that Insurers did 
not change the language of the exclusion until after it had 
agreed to renew its policy with Insurers, and that Insurers 
either did not notify Township of the change in the exclusion or 
did not explain the significance of the change. 
 Alternatively, Township might be able to demonstrate 
that Insurers somehow misled it by indicating that, despite the 
language of the policy, claims such as the one at issue here 
would be covered.   
 In sum, we believe that Township could conceivably 
prove that it had a reasonable expectation of coverage despite 
policy language that appears to those not familiar with its 
relationship with Insurers unambiguously to preclude coverage, 
and that it therefore might be able to obtain coverage.  We 
stress, however, that our holding must not be overstated.  If 
Township was aware of the change in the exclusion provision 
(..continued) 
purchase insurance without informing the insured of the change 
and its consequences. 
  
before it elected to renew its policy with Insurers and Insurers 
made no representation that the scope of coverage would not be 
reduced, or if after Township agreed to renew Insurers informed 
Township of the change and its significance, then Insurers must 
prevail because, in our view, the policy unambiguously excludes 
coverage for claims such as the one at issue here. 
 We are thus persuaded by Township's argument that 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) was inappropriate.  Before 
the district court denied the motion to amend and dismissed 
Township's complaint for failure to state a claim, it should have 
allowed discovery to enable it to review the circumstances 
surrounding the insurance agreement in order to determine whether 
Township might have had a reasonable expectation of coverage in 
this situation despite the language of the policy.  We will 
therefore reverse and remand so that the district court can take 
these additional steps. 
 B. Unconscionability 
 Township also argues that the new exclusion clause was 
unconscionable because it effectively abrogated most, if not all, 
of the coverage under the agreement and because only a handful of 
carriers offered this type of coverage.  "Unconscionability 
requires a two-fold determination: that the contractual terms are 
unreasonably favorable to the drafter and that there is no 
meaningful choice on the part of the other party regarding 
acceptance of the provisions."  Worldwide Underwriters Ins. Co. 
  
v. Brady, 973 F.2d 192, 196 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Koval v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 366 Pa. Super. 415, 531 A.2d 487, 491 
(1987)).  See also Bishop v. Washington, 331 Pa. Super. 387, 480 
A.2d 1088, 1093 (1984); Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, 
Insurance Law § 6.3(b)(2) (1988) ("In some cases ... the 
unambiguous language of an insurance policy provides so little 
coverage that it would be unconscionable to permit the insurer to 
enforce it."). 
 Here Township argues that application of the exclusion 
to claims arising from prior equitable, non-monetary disputes, 
unreasonably favors Insurers.  Under the terms of the policy, 
Insurers agreed to pay Township for all civil claims for money 
damages.  The policy did not cover suits seeking strictly 
equitable relief.6  Township argues that if it had filed a claim 
at the commencement of the Blanche Road state dispute, Insurers 
would have denied coverage under the express terms of the policy.  
Township asserts that it is unfair for Insurers to apply the 
exclusion broadly so as to deny coverage of the Blanche Road § 
1983 action because it related to prior disputes, when these 
disputes were of a nature which would not have been covered by 
                     
6
.  The policy excludes payments for 
 4.  a.  claims, demands seeking relief, or 
redress, in any form other than money 
damages; 
  b.  fees or expenses relating to claims, 
demands or actions seeking relief or redress, 
in any form other than money damages. 
  
the insurance agreement and thus would not have been the basis of 
a claim under it or under any similar prior policy. 
 The exclusion is unconscionable, Township contends, 
because the majority of its litigation originates in prior state 
administrative proceedings.  Generally, a claimant will first 
seek relief from a Township agency.7  Such disputes rarely ripen 
into lawsuits for money damages unless the plaintiff finds he 
cannot obtain adequate relief through the local agency 
proceedings.  Because of this, Township believes that the 
exclusion as interpreted by Insurers leaves it with virtually no 
coverage, since claims for non-monetary relief that arise during 
the policy period are not covered, and claims for monetary relief 
will almost inevitably be somehow tied to pre-policy litigation 
and therefore excluded.  
 Township drastically overstates the extent to which the 
exclusion reduces its coverage.  In reality, the exclusion only 
creates a gap in Township's coverage for those claims that have 
arisen in some form prior to the effective date of the policy.  
This is because of Condition 4 of the policy, which states as 
follows: 
  If during the policy period or extended 
discovery period: 
  (a) The Public Entity or the Insureds 
shall receive written or oral notice from any 
                     
7
.  Township maintains at least seventeen administrative 
Commissions and Boards.  Among them are the Township Council, 
Board of Auditors, Code Appeals Board, Zoning Hearing Board, 
Budget Committee, Environmental Advisory Board, and the Economic 
Development Corp.  
  
party that it is the intention of such party 
to hold the Insureds responsible for the 
results of any specified Wrongful Act done or 
alleged to have been done by the Insureds 
while acting in the capacity aforementioned; 
or 
  (b) The Public Entity or the Insureds 
shall become aware of any occurrence which 
may subsequently give rise to a claim being 
made against the Insureds in respect of any 
such Wrongful Act; 
  Then the Public Entity or the Insureds 
shall as soon as practicable give written 
notice to the Company of the receipt of such 
written or oral notice under Clause 4(a) or 
of such occurrence under Clause 4(b).  Upon 
the Insurer's receipt of such notice any 
claim which may subsequently be made against 
the Insureds arising out of such alleged 
Wrongful Act shall, for the purposes of this 
Policy, be treated as a claim made during the 
policy period in which such notice was given 
or if given during the extended discovery 
period as a claim made during such discovery 
period. 
As a result of this provision Township can obtain coverage for 
all its claims so long as it notifies Insurers of potential 
claims during the policy period.  The only effects of the 
additional exclusionary language, then, are to create the 
aforementioned gap in coverage and to place the additional burden 
of notification on Township.  Neither of these effects render the 
policy unconscionable in our view. 
 IV. 
 Lastly, we address Township's contention that the 
district court abused its discretion by granting Insurers' cross 
motion for sanctions under Rule 11.  After a hearing on the 
motion, the district court imposed a sanction in the sum of 
  
$20008 because Township had filed a motion with the district 
court to determine the Rule 59(e) motion while a timely petition 
for rehearing was pending before this Court.  Finding the motion 
to be duplicative, the district court held that Township had 
failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry prior to filing.  It 
concluded that Insurers incurred needless expense in having to 
respond to Township's jurisdictionally defective motion. 
 We have held that Rule 11 sanctions may be awarded in 
exceptional circumstances in order to "discourage plaintiffs from 
bringing baseless actions or making frivolous motions."  Doering 
v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d 
Cir. 1988).  See also Morristown Daily Record, Inc. v. Graphic 
Communications Union, Local 8N, 832 F.2d 31, 32 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1987) (noting that "Rule 11 is not to be used routinely when the 
parties disagree about the correct resolution of a matter in 
litigation").  The Rule provides in relevant part 
 The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certificate by the signer that 
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or 
other paper; that to the best of the signer's 
knowledge, information and belief formed 
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded 
                     
8
.  Although Insurers first claimed that their costs associated 
with answering the Rule 59(e) motion amounted to $8,800, and then 
lowered that amount to $5,535, the court determined a reasonable 
sanction to be $2000. 
  
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, 
and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation . . .. 
 
 The Rule imposes an affirmative duty on the parties to 
conduct a reasonable inquiry into the applicable law and facts 
prior to filing.  Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic 
Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 551 (1991).  See also 
Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274 (3d Cir. 1994).  An 
inquiry is considered reasonable under the circumstances if it 
provides the party with "an 'objective knowledge or belief at the 
time of the filing of a challenged paper' that the claim was 
well-grounded in law and fact."  Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor 
Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 289 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 
S. Ct. 373 (1991) (quoting Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp., 899 
F.2d 1350, 1359 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 373 
(1991)). 
 We dismissed Township's original appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction without specifying the basis for our decision.  
Instead of speculating about our rationale for this dismissal, 
Township sought clarification of the order by filing a petition 
  
for rehearing.  Apparently believing that the dismissal may have 
been due to the pending Rule 59(e) motion, Township also filed a 
motion in district court to determine that motion.    
 The district court correctly noted the well settled 
principle that, once a notice of appeal is filed, jurisdiction is 
no longer vested in the district court.  Griggs v. Provident 
Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982).  This rule 
prevents "the confusion and inefficiency which would of necessity 
result were two courts to be considering the same issue or issues 
simultaneously."  Venen v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 117, 121 (3d Cir. 
1985).  There are, however, exceptions to this general rule.9  
Specifically, "a premature notice of appeal does not divest the 
district court of jurisdiction."  Mondrow v. Fountain House, 867 
F.2d 798, 800 (3d Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).  We have held that 
in order to avoid delay at the trial level "district courts 
should continue to exercise their jurisdiction when faced with 
clearly premature notices of appeal."  Id.  Because Township's 
notice of appeal was premature, Township's filing of the motion 
to determine the Rule 59(e) motion was not outside the bounds of 
objective reasonableness. 
 Insurers maintain that Mondrow does not apply to the 
instant facts because it was not clear that Township's appeal was 
                     
9
.  For example, during the pendency of an appeal, the district 
court may review applications for attorney's fees, grant or 
modify injunctive relief, issue orders regarding the record on 
appeal, and vacate a bail bond and order arrest.  Venen, 758 F.2d 
at 120 n.2. 
  
premature.  We find this argument to be without merit.  There is 
no doubt that Township's June 23, 1992, letter could be 
considered to be a motion to amend pursuant to Rule 59(e).  The 
letter expressly requested that the district court clarify 
whether its order applied to all parties and whether it dismissed 
the case without prejudice.  The letter also requested leave to 
file an amended complaint.  While the court entered an order 
denying the request to file an amended complaint, the order was 
silent as to the Rule 59(e) motion.  As a result of the court's 
failure to dispose of the motion, Township's appeal could well be 
deemed to be premature.  If so, it would then be within the 
bounds of reason for Township to file the motion to determine the 
Rule 59(e) motion based on its conclusion that the district court 
would continue to exercise jurisdiction.   
 Furthermore, we can find no support for any allegation 
that Township's motion was an attempt to harass Insurers or cause 
unnecessary delay of the judicial proceedings.  To the contrary, 
Township appeared to be endeavoring to cure the jurisdictional 
defect in order to facilitate appellate review.  Indeed, Insurers 
argue in support of the sanction that Township should have chosen 
one of two realistic procedural options:  1)  seek rehearing in 
this Court or 2) seek to persuade the district court that it had 
not yet resolved its Rule 59 motion.  If Insurers can advocate 
that Township should have taken action in either court, we do not 
find it unreasonable that Township, unsure of the choice it 
  
should make, sought to protect its case on the merits by taking 
actions in both courts. 
 There are grey areas surrounding the issues of 
appealability, prematurity of appeals, and the situs of 
jurisdiction during the period when a party is attempting to 
clarify rulings by either or both the district court and the 
appellate court.  When the issue of the ripeness of an appeal is 
not clear, a party should not be sanctioned under Rule 11 for 
taking reasonable steps to perfect the appeal or clarify its 
status.  A more stringent rule would penalize the confused but 
cautious litigant.  That is not the aim of Rule 11. 
 For all of these reasons, we do not find that Township 
so exceeded the bounds of Rule 11 that sanctions should be 
imposed.  We find to the contrary that the district court abused 
its discretion because appropriate circumstances to justify the 
imposition of a Rule 11 sanction against Township did not exist. 
  V. 
 We will reverse the order dismissing the complaint 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and remand the case to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  In addition, we will reverse the order of the district 
court imposing a Rule 11 sanction against Township. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bensalem Township v. International Surplus 
Lines Insurance Company et al. 
Nos. 93-1071 & 1072 
 
 
HUTCHINSON, J., Concurring. 
 
 
 I join the opinion of the Court.  I write separately 
only to emphasize the distinction between this case and Standard 
Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 503 Pa. 300, 469 
  
A.2d 563 (1983), which embodies Pennsylvania's general practice 
of applying the "plain language" rule to construe exclusionary 
clauses in liability insurance contracts, instead of considering 
the "reasonable expectations" of the insured.  Since Standard 
Venetian Blind was decided, it appears to me that Pennsylvania 
has created exceptions to the plain language rule which make that 
rule inapplicable to the facts now before us. 
 It now seems apparent that Standard Venetian Blind did 
not signal wholesale rejection of the reasonable expectations 
principle foreshadowed in Rempel v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. 
Inc., 471 Pa. 404, 370 A.2d 366 (1977), expressed in Collister v. 
Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 479 Pa. 579, 388 A.2d 1346 (1978), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979), and reiterated in Tonkovic v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 513 Pa. 445, 521 A.2d 920 (1987).  
Instead, I think Standard Venetian Blind did no more than reject 
the attempt of Hionis v. Northern Mut. Ins. Co., 230 Pa. Super. 
511, 327 A.2d 363 (1974), to wholly divorce the construction of 
exclusionary clauses from their text.  See id. (insurer has 
affirmative duty to explain the effect of all policy exclusions 
in precise, concrete terms without regard to the clarity of the 
language of the policy or the reasonableness of the insured's 
expectations). 
 Thus, in Standard Venetian Blind, all members of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed that Hionis's failure to apply 
the clear language of the exclusions of the general liability 
  
policy was inconsistent with the objective theory of contracts.  
The Hionis rationale would have covered insureds against risks as 
to which they had no reasonable expectation of coverage.  Indeed, 
the majority in Standard Venetian Blind recognized the "manifest 
inequality of bargaining power between an insurance company and a 
purchaser of insurance," reasoning that a court may on occasion 
deviate from the plain language of a contract of insurance.  
Standard Venetian Blind, Co., 503 Pa. at 307, 469 A.2d at 567.  
Accordingly, under Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), I think 
the Court correctly decides that the insured Township should be 
given an opportunity to pursue discovery for the purpose of 
uncovering evidence that would tend to show Bensalem was not sold 
the policy it asked International Surplus Lines to provide, was 
not advised that this "claims-made" policy left it without 
coverage for risks it wanted covered, or that the promises given 
were made largely illusory because of the restrictive way the 
exclusions the insurer relies on interact with the claims-made 
policy. 
 In the present case, as in Collister, the Township 
claims that the policy it received was not the policy it wanted 
to buy and, most significantly, was led by the insurer to believe 
it was purchasing.  The discovery the insured seeks is designed 
to support that allegation.  Therefore, I believe the Court 
correctly decides that the Township should be given an 
opportunity to discover evidence that would support its theory 
  
that the policy it received did not cover risks it was reasonably 
led to believe would be covered. 
 This case is subject to much the same analysis that 
Justice Manderino used in his plurality opinion announcing the 
judgment of the court in Rempel.  That analysis to my mind 
embodies an unobjectionable rule that an insurer should not be 
allowed to disclaim coverage after a loss occurred of a risk that 
its insured advised the company it wanted covered.  Rempel, 471 
Pa. at 410-12, 370 A.2d at 371. 
 Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Standard 
Venetian Blind did not adopt the Rempel principle in its broad 
form, the antipathy the Rempel plurality expressed, to the 
failure of insurance companies to alert their customers to 
exclusions that are likely to remain hidden until a loss occurs, 
was reiterated, this time by a majority, in Collister.  As the 
Court points out, Collister took an important step towards the 
reasonable expectation standard when the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court stated, "[c]ourts should be concerned with assuring that 
the insurance purchasing public's reasonable expectations are 
fulfilled."  Collister, 479 Pa. at 594, 388 A.2d at 1353.  
Furthermore, as the Court cogently demonstrates, this theme was 
continued in Tonkovic, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's most 
recent pronouncement on this matter, and thereafter in the 
  
decisions of the Pennsylvania Superior Court also cited in this 
Court's opinion. See Majority Op. at 14-15.10 
                     
10
.  Tonkovic, which can be analyzed in terms of an illusory 
promise, is relevant here because Bensalem Township's policy is a 
"claims-made" policy.  As such, it limits coverage to claims 
filed within the policy's term.  Standard Venetian Blind involved 
an "occurrence-made" policy which provided coverage for any 
covered event that occurred during the policy term, without 
regard to when the claim was made.  See American Gas. Co. of 
Reading, Pennsylvania v. Confinisco, 17 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 
1994) (discussing differences between claims- and occurrence-made 
policies).  Claims-made policies allow the insurer to make a more 
precise calculation of premiums based upon the costs of the risks 
assumed, a calculation that is difficult, if not impossible, in 
an occurrence-made policy where the insurer is faced with an 
unlimited "tail" of potential liability extending beyond the 
policy period. 
 
    In a claims-made policy, however, limitation of coverage to 
claims filed within the policy term can sometimes interact with 
broad exclusions like those present here to defeat the 
"reasonable expectations" of the insured or perhaps, in some 
cases, make the promised coverage illusory.  See Tonkovic, 513 
Pa. 445, 521 A.2d 920; Worldwide Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brady, 
973 F.2d 192 (3d Cir. 1992).  Pennsylvania's exceptions to the 
plain language rule of Standard Venetian Blind seek to balance 
the relative advantages an insurance company has in underwriting 
claims-made policies with the insured's reasonable expectations 
of coverage.  See Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 100 
N.J. 309, 495 A.2d 395 (1985) (for an excellent discussion of the 
discrete issues presented by claims and occurrence made 
policies).  Still, if insurance is to serve its basic purpose of 
splitting economic loss that would be catastrophic to a single 
insured among a group of persons facing similar risks, exclusion 
of coverage for losses that a particular insured is more or less 
certain to suffer is necessary.  For who, as it was once said, 
would not give up a peppercorn in exchange for a pound and who, 
no matter how well endowed with pounds, could long continue such 
an exchange?  The exclusions in question here may be meant to do 
no more than solve the problem of moral risk.  Whether they go so 
far as to deprive the insured of the coverage it reasonably 
expected to receive remains to be seen. 
  
 Accordingly, I agree with the Court that Pennsylvania 
would not, under the circumstances here, apply Standard Venetian 
Blind's plain language rule to exclude Bensalem Township from the 
coverage it seeks if it can show that it reasonably expected such 
coverage.  Instead, I think Pennsylvania would look beyond the 
strict technical language of this policy's exclusion to determine 
what coverage the insured told the insurer it wanted to buy and 
whether the insurer reasonably led it to expect such coverage by 
the terms of the policy it tendered. 
 Accordingly, I join the opinion of the Court. 
